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Summary. This paper uses a simple stochastic market fraction (MF) asset pric-
ing model to investigate market dominance, profitability, and how traders adopting
fundamental analysis or trend following strategies can survive under various market
conditions in the long/short-run. This contrasts with the modern theory of finance
which relies on the paradigm of utility maximizing representative agents and ratio-
nal expectations assumptions which some contemporary theorists regard as extreme.
This school of thought would predict that trend followers will be driven out of the
markets in the long-run. Our analysis shows that in a MF framework this is not
necessarily the case and that trend followers can survive in the long-run.
1 Introduction
The modern theory of finance relies on the paradigm that asset prices are the
outcome of the market interaction of utility maximizing representative agents
who are rational when forming expectations about future market outcomes.
The assumption that agents rationally impound all relevant information into
their trading decisions produces price changes which are random, and conse-
quently exhibit random walk behaviour. The representative agent assumption,
as argued by Friedman [14], leads to the conjecture that irrational traders (also
called less informed traders or chartists) could profit in the short-run, but are
expected to perish in the long-run while rational traders (also called informed
traders or fundamentalists) should be the only long-run survivors.
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Despite all the evidence presented in academic journals that security prices
follow random walks the use of technical trading rules is widespread amongst
financial market practitioners as evidenced by the growth in hedge funds em-
ploying quantitative trading strategies: trend following is one of the most
popular trading rules. Also, finance theory provides limited economic expla-
nations for the well documented stylized facts reported in the empirical finance
literature (see Pagan [30]). The existence of excess volatility (asset return is
more volatile relative to the dividends and underlying cash flows), volatility
clustering (high/low asset return fluctuations are followed by high/low fluc-
tuations), either positive or negative skewness and excess kurtosis (compared
to normally distributed returns), and long-range dependence (insignificant
autocorrelations (ACs) of raw returns and hyperbolic decline of ACs of the
absolute and squared returns, see Ding et al.[13]) are difficult to accommodate
within the established theoretical structure of market efficiency and rational
expectations (see, for example, Shiller [31]). In practice, GARCH methodology
has been successful modeling volatility clustering and capturing the short-run
dynamics of volatility, but fails to provide an economic explanation.
Agent-Based Modeling is an alternative paradigm which may provide an
appropriate theoretical and methodological framework to explain the styl-
ized facts. For those new to this area we refer them to the survey papers by
Hommes [20] and LeBaron [24] for the recent development in this literature.
In contrast to the traditional assumptions of investor homogeneity and ratio-
nal expectations, the latter of which is regarded as an extreme informational
assumption (see, for example, Cochrane [11]), agent-based models allow for
heterogeneous agents, potentially showing bounded rational behaviour, who
have different attitudes to risk and different expectations about the future
evolution of prices. This approach has been shown to be able to character-
ize the dynamics of financial asset returns. The works of Arthur et al. [2],
Brock and Hommes [3], Chiarella [6], Chiarella and He [7] and [8], Day and
Huang [12] LeBaron [21], Levy et al. [25], Lux [28], among others, are exam-
ples of this approach. Agent-Based Models attempt to explain various types
of market behaviour and to replicate the well documented empirical features
of actual financial markets.
Heterogeneous agent-based models have had success in explaining market
behavior and reproducing stylized facts. However, there are few works explic-
itly investigating if irrational traders can survive in the long-run. In this paper
a market fractions (MF) model with heterogeneous traders - fundamentalists
(rational investors who believe the market price is mean reverting to fun-
damental price) and trend followers (irrational investors who believe market
price will follow the trend generated from historical prices) - participate in a
simple stochastic asset-pricing and wealth dynamics framework to investigate
market dominance, profitability, and if they survive in the short/long-run. Al-
though the techniques discussed in Arnold [1] may be useful for analyzing the
stochastic model the mathematical analysis of nonlinear stochastic dynamical
systems is difficult in general. Therefore, this analysis is conducted through
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Monte Carlo simulation (see Li et al. [26] and [27] for a more systematic study
on this). The results from our simulation analysis show that, as expected, fun-
damentalists survive in the long-run and their profitability improves as they
become increasingly confident of their forecasts of fundamental value. More
interestingly, the key insight from our analysis is that trend followers can sur-
vive in the long-run even though they don’t engage in information processing
to establish the fundamental value of the asset to inform their trading strat-
egy. In the context of our MF model this can be explained by the learning
mechanism encapsulated in the trend followers forecasts. Our results also show
that trend followers’ profitability increases as their market share increases and
when fundamentalists become naive traders.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a market fraction
model with heterogeneous agents. In this model the market clearing price is
set by a market maker who adjusts the market price in response to aggregate
excess demand in the market. Next, the expectations and learning mechanisms
for the fundamentalists and trend followers is introduced. The latter part
of this section develops the full market fraction stochastic model for asset
prices and wealth dynamics. In Section 3 the profitability and survivability
of fundamental and trend following strategies is explored under alternative
scenarios. Section 4 discusses the key insights from the study and identifies
logical extensions for future research.
2 Heterogeneous Beliefs and Market Fractions
Intuitively, market population fractions among different types of traders play
an important role in financial markets. Markets can be driven by certain
types of investors at different time periods. This is particularly the case in
either a bull or bear market. Empirical evidence from Taylor and Allen [32]
suggests that at least 90% of the traders place some weight on technical anal-
ysis, such as moving average and trend following rules, over various time
horizons. In particular, traders rely more on technical analysis, as opposed
to fundamental analysis, at shorter horizons. As the time horizons increases
more traders rely on fundamental rather than technical analysis. In addition,
there are a proportion of traders who do not change their strategies over all
time horizons. This situation is consistent with money-managers following a
longer-term value investing strategy. Their time horizon for realizing gains is
often years as opposed to days for the technical analyst, see Haugen [16] and
Chan and Lakonishok [5]. Theoretically, the study by Brock and Hommes [3]
shows that when different groups of traders have different expectations about
future prices and dividends compete between trading strategies and choose
their strategy according to an evolutionary fitness measure the corresponding
deterministic system can exhibit very complicated, and even, chaotic dynam-
ics. The adaptive switching mechanism proposed by Brock and Hommes [3]
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is an important element of the adaptive belief model. It is based on both a
fitness function and a discrete choice probability.
In this paper we employ the market fraction (MF) model introduced in He
and Li [17]. It is a simplified version of Brock and Hommes’ framework which
assumes that the market fraction parameters among heterogeneous agents
are fixed. Apart from its mathematical tractability this simplification has a
number of distinct advantages. First, it clearly identifies how different market
fractions influence the market price. In Brock and Hommes’ framework this
is difficult due to the amplifying effect of the exponential function used in the
discrete choice probability which makes the market fractions very sensitive
to price changes and the stated fitness functions. Second, our model doesn’t
allow agents to switch between trading strategies. This makes it easier to
characterize market dominance, profitability, and survivability. Finally, it is
important to understand how the trading strategies are linked to aspects
of price behaviour. Having market fractions among heterogeneous agents as
fixed parameters allows for an explicit examination of how market fractions
influence price behaviour.
The MF model considered in the following discussion, introduced in He
and Li [17], follows the standard discounted value asset pricing model with
heterogeneous agents. The market clearing price is arrived at via a market
maker scenario in line with Day and Huang [12] and Chiarella and He [10]
rather than the Walrasian auctioneer scenario used in Brock and Hommes [4].
We focus on a simple case in which there are three classes of participants in
the asset market: two groups of traders, fundamentalists and trend followers,
and a market maker.
2.1 Market Fraction and Market Maker
Consider an asset pricing model with one risky asset and one risk-free asset.
It is assumed that the supply of the risk-free asset is perfectly elastic with a
gross return of R = 1 + r/K, where r stands for a constant risk-free rate per
annum and K stands for the trading frequency. Typically, K = 1, 12, 52 and
250 for trading periods of a year, month, week, and a day. To calibrate the
stylized facts observed from daily price movements in financial markets K is
set equal to 250.
Let Pt be the price (ex-dividend) per share for the risky asset at time t and
{Dt} be the stochastic dividend process for the risky asset. Then the wealth
of a typical investor h at t+ 1 is given by
Wh,t+1 = RWh,t + [Pt+1 +Dt+1 −RPt]zh,t, (1)
whereWh,t and zh,t are the wealth and the number of shares of the risky asset
purchased by investor h at t. Let Eh,t and Vh,t be the beliefs of type h traders
about the conditional expectation and variance of quantities at t + 1 based
on their information set at time t. Where the excess capital gain on the risky
asset at t+ 1 is denoted by Rt+1, that is
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Rt+1 = Pt+1 +Dt+1 −RPt. (2)
Then it follows from (1) and (2) that
Eh,t(Wt+1) = RWt + Eh,t(Rt+1)zh,t, Vh,t(Wt+1) = z
2
h,tVh,t(Rt+1), (3)
where zh,t is the demand by agent h for the risky asset. Assume that trader
h has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function with the risk
aversion coefficient ah (that is Uh(W ) = −e
−ahW ), the optimal demand zh,t






Given the heterogeneity and the nature of asymmetric information among
traders we consider two trading strategies corresponding to two types of
boundedly rational traders: fundamentalists and trend followers. Their be-
liefs are defined in the following discussion. Assume the market fraction of the
fundamentalists and trend followers is n1 and n2 with risk aversion coefficient
a1 and a2, respectively. Let m = n1 − n2 ∈ [−1, 1]. Obviously, m = 1,−1
correspond to the cases when all the traders are fundamentalists or trend fol-
lowers. Assume a zero supply of outside shares. Then, using (4), the aggregate
excess demand per investor (ze,t) is given by











To complete the model we assume that the market is cleared by a market
maker. The role of the market maker is to take a long (when ze,t < 0) or
short (when ze,t > 0) position so as to clear the market. At the end of period
t, after the market maker has carried out all transactions, he or she adjusts
the price for the next period in the direction of the observed excess demand.
Let µ be the speed of price adjustment of the market maker. To capture
unexpected market news or noise created by noise traders we introduce a noisy
demand term δ˜t which is an IID normally distributed random variable with
δ˜t ∼ N (0, σ
2
δ ). In this paper, we assume a constant volatility noisy demand
and the volatility is related to an average fundamental price level. This noisy
demand may also depend on the market price. Theoretically, how the price
dynamics are influenced by adding different noisy demand is still a difficult
problem. Here, we focus on the constant volatility noisy demand case and use
Monte Carlo simulations and statistical analysis to gain some insights into
this problem. Based on these assumptions the market price is determined by
Pt+1 = Pt + µze,t + δ˜t. (6)
Using (5), this becomes
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We use Figure 1 to illustrate the general role of heterogeneous expectation
for our two groups of agents and how the market cleaning price is arrived at.
Let pf,et,t+1 and p
c,e
t,t+1 be the expected price at time t+1 for the fundamental-
ists and chartists conditional upon their information set at time t. The mar-
ket maker aggregates the demand from agents’ heterogeneous expectations
to form the expected market price pet,t+1 at time t and adjusts the market
price at time t+1 accordingly. The important feature of this structure is that
the price generating mechanism is driven by expectations feedback. Observed
market prices are then used to form expectations for the next period which
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Fig. 1. Expectations Feedback
It should be pointed out that market maker behaviour in this model is
highly stylized. For instance, the inventory of the market maker built up as a
result of the accumulation of various long and short positions is not considered.
This could affect his or her behaviour and the market maker price setting role
in (7) could be a function of the inventory. Allowing µ to be a function of
inventory would be one way to model such behaviour. In this paper it is
best thought of as a market friction. One of the aims of our analysis is to
understand how this friction affects the market dynamics.
2.2 Fundamentalists
We assume that Ft = {Pt, Pt−1, · · · ,Dt,Dt−1, · · · } is the common information
set at time t. Apart from the common information set, the fundamentalists
have superior information on the fundamental value, P ∗t , of the risky asset
and they also realize the existence of non-fundamental traders such as trend
followers to be introduced in the following discussion. They believe that the
stock price may be driven away from the fundamental value in the short-run,
but it will eventually converge to the fundamental value in the long-run. The
speed of convergence measures their confidence level in the fundamental value.
More precisely, we assume that the fundamental value satisfies a stationary
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random walk process (as we know that the fundamental value driven by this
random walk process can be negative)
P ∗t+1 = P
∗
t [1 + σǫǫ˜t], ǫ˜t ∼ N (0, 1), σǫ ≥ 0, P
∗
0 = P¯ > 0, (8)
where ǫ˜t is independent of the noisy demand process δ˜t. We assume the con-
ditional mean and variance of the fundamental traders are
E1,t(Pt+1) = Pt + α(P
∗
t+1 − Pt), V1,t(Pt+1) = σ
2
1 , (9)
where σ21 stands for a constant variance for the price. Here parameter α ∈ [0, 1]
is the speed of price adjustment toward the fundamental value. It measures
their level of confidence in fundamental value. Specifically, for α = 1 the fun-
damental traders are fully confident about the fundamental value and adjust
their expected price at the next period instantaneously to the fundamental
value. When α = 0 fundamentalists become naive traders. In general, the
fundamental traders believe that markets are efficient and prices converge to
their fundamental value. An increase (decrease) in α indicates that the fun-
damental traders have high (low) confidence in their estimated fundamental
value, leading to a quick (slow) adjustment of the expected price towards the
fundamental price.
2.3 Trend followers
Unlike the fundamentalists, trend followers are technical traders who believe
that future price changes can be predicted from various patterns or trends
generated from the history of prices. The trend followers are assumed to ex-
trapolate the latest observed price change over prices’ long-run sample mean
and to adjust their variance estimate accordingly. More precisely, their con-
ditional mean and variance are assumed to satisfy
E2,t(Pt+1) = Pt + γ(Pt − ut), V2,t(Pt+1) = σ
2
1 + b2vt, (10)
where γ, b2 ≥ 0 are constants, and ut and vt are the sample mean and vari-
ance, respectively, which follow a learning process. The parameter γ measures
the extrapolation rate. High (low) values of γ correspond to strong (weak)
extrapolation from the trend. The coefficient b2 measures the influence of the
sample variance on the conditional variance estimated by the trend followers
who believe in a more volatile price movement. Various learning schemes can
be used to estimate the sample mean ut and variance vt (see Chiarella and
He ([9], [10]) for related studies on heterogeneous learning and asset pricing
models with heterogeneous agents who’s conditional mean and variance follow
various learning processes). In this paper we assume that
ut =δut−1 + (1− δ)Pt, (11)
vt =δvt−1 + δ(1− δ)(Pt − ut−1)
2, (12)
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where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant. This is the limiting process of a geometric decay
process where the memory lag length tends to infinity. Basically, a geometric
decay probability process (1 − δ){1, δ, δ2, · · · } is associated with historical
prices {Pt, Pt−1, Pt−2, · · · }. The parameter δ measures the geometric decay
rate. For δ = 0, the sample mean ut = Pt, which is the latest observed price,
while δ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.95 and 0.999 gives a half life of 0.43 day, 1 day, 2.5 weeks
and 2.7 years, respectively. The selection of this process is two fold. First,
traders tend to put a high weight on the most recent prices and less weight
on the more remote prices when they estimate the sample mean and variance.
Second, it has the mathematical advantage of analytical tractability.
2.4 The Complete Stochastic Model
To simplify our analysis we assume that the dividend process Dt follows
a normal distribution Dt ∼ N (D¯, σ
2
D). The expected long-run fundamen-
tal value P¯ = D¯/(R − 1) and the unconditional variances of price and
dividend over the trading period are related by σ2D = qσ
2
1 . In this pa-
per, we choose σ21 = σ
2
P¯
/K and q = r2. This can be justified as follows.
Let σP¯ be the annual volatility of Pt and D¯t = rPt be the annual div-









/K = r2σ21 . For all numerical simulations in this paper
we choose P¯ = $100, r = 5% p.a. σ = 20% p.a., K = 250. Correspondingly,
R = 1 + 0.05/250 = 1.0002, σ21 = (100 × 0.2)
2/250 = 8/5 and σ2D = 1/250.




[α(P ∗t+1 − Pt)− (R− 1)(Pt − P¯ )]. (13)
In particular, when P ∗t = P¯ ,
z1,t =
(α+R− 1)(P¯ − Pt)
a1(1 + q)σ21
. (14)
Similarly, from (10), (using D¯ = (R−1)P¯ ) the trend followers’ optimal demand
is
z2,t =
γ(Pt − ut)− (R− 1)(Pt − P¯ )
a2σ21(1 + q + b vt)
, (15)
where b = b2/σ
2
1 . Subsisting (13) and (15) into (7), the price dynamics un-
der a market maker is determined by the following 4-dimensional stochastic
difference system (SDS hereafter)
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[α(P ∗t+1 − Pt)− (R− 1)(Pt − P¯ )]
+ (1−m)
γ(Pt − ut)− (R− 1)(Pt − P¯ )
a2σ21(1 + q + b vt)
]
+ δ˜t,
ut = δut−1 + (1− δ)Pt,
vt = δvt−1 + δ(1− δ)(Pt − ut−1)
2,
P ∗t+1 = P
∗
t [1 + σǫǫ˜t].
(16)
Using Monte Carlo simulation and statistical analysis, He and Li [17] found
that the long-run behaviour and convergence of the market prices and various
under and over-reaction autocorrelation patterns of returns can be character-
ized by the dynamics, including the stability and bifurcations, of the under-
lying deterministic system. In the relation to the ability of the MF model to
characterize the stylized facts, especially the long-range dependence in volatil-
ity, He and Li [18] demonstrate that agent heterogeneity, risk-adjusted trend
chasing through the geometric learning process, and the interplay of noisy
fundamental and demand processes and the underlying deterministic dynam-
ics can be the source of power-law distributed fluctuations. In particular, the
noisy demand plays an important role in the generation of insignificant au-
tocorrelations (ACs) on returns, while the significant decaying AC patterns
of the absolute returns and squared returns are more influenced by the noisy
fundamental process. A statistical analysis based on Monte Carlo simula-
tions is conducted to characterize the decay rate. Realistic estimates of the
power-law decay indices and the (FI)GARCH parameters are presented. This
analysis provides some insights into the understanding of financial markets.
In the following discussion we introduce measures of wealth dynamics and we
explore the potential of the MF model to characterize the profitability and
survivability of fundamental and trend following strategies.
2.5 Wealth Dynamics and Shares
We assume that traders’ wealth follows a stochastic process. To be able to
measure the wealth dynamics among different trading strategies and to ex-
amine the market dominance and price behaviour we introduce two wealth
measures. The first measures the absolute level of the wealth share (or pro-
portion) of the representative agent from each type, called the absolute wealth








where W1,t and W2,t are the wealth at time t of the representative trader
of the fundamentalists and trend followers, respectively. This measure can be
used to measure the evolutionary performance or profitability of the two trad-
ing strategies: As w1,t (w2,t) increases the profitability of the fundamentalists
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(trend followers) increases. The second measures the overall market wealth
share, called the market wealth share for short, of the different trading strate-




(1 +m)W1,t + (1−m)W2,t
, w¯2,t =
(1−m)W2,t
(1 +m)W1,t + (1−m)W2,t
(18)
A high market wealth share w¯1,t (w¯2,t) indicates market dominance of the
fundamentalists (trend followers) with respect to the overall market wealth.


































and the market wealth shares are governed by
w¯1,t =
(1 +m)V2,t
(1 +m)V2,t + (1−m)V1,t
, w¯2,t =
(1−m)V1,t
(1 +m)V2,t + (1−m)V1,t
. (20)
For these wealth measures it is difficult to obtain explicit closed form expres-
sions in terms of (stationary) state variables. In this paper we use the auxiliary
functions (V1,t, V2,t) and numerical simulations to study the wealth dynamics
of the fundamentalists and trend followers and the market impact of the two
different trading strategies.
3 Wealth Accumulation, Profitability and Survivability
Friedman [14] argued that irrational traders (such as the trend followers in our
model) may do better than rational traders (such as the fundamentalists) in
the short-run, but over the long-run they will be driven out of the market and
rational traders will be the only long-run survivors. We now justify Friedman’s
hypothesis by analyzing the wealth dynamics of our heterogeneous market
fraction model in which traders’ beliefs are time invariant. Consequently, we
examine profitability and survivability of both types of trading strategies.
The dynamics of the speed of price adjustment and the market fraction are
considered in the following discussion.
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3.1 Dynamics of the Price Adjustment Speed α
In our model, the market price is related to the fundamental price through
the activity from the fundamentalists. Therefore, how the market price reflects
the fundamental price depends on the reaction of the fundamentalists to the
fundamental price. It is believed that chartists may perform better when the
market price is far away from the fundamental price, while the fundamentalists
may do better when the market price reflect the fundamental price. Hence it is
interesting to analyze the wealth dynamics when the fundamentalists behave
differently. In the following we examine the wealth dynamics of the model
when the confidence level of the fundamentalists on the fundamental price,
measured by parameter α, changes.
To assess the impact of α we choose parameters set to
γ = 2.1, δ = 0.85, µ = 0.43, m = 0, w1,0 = 0.5, α = 1, 0.5, 0.1, 0 (21)
by fixing market fraction m and varying α. For each set of parameters, we
run one simulation over 20,000 time periods in order to see possible limiting
behaviours.
























Fig. 2. Time series of the absolute wealth accumulation of the fundamentalists w1,t
with α = 1, 0.5, 0.1 and 0.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the absolute wealth share accumulations for the fun-
damentalists with α = 1, 0.5, 0.1, 0 and keeping all the other conditions the
same. This figure shows that (i) trend followers survive in the long-run for
α = 1, 0.5 and 0.1 in the sense that their absolute wealth share does not van-
ish, although they accumulate less wealth shares over the time period; (ii) the
trend followers do better than the fundamentalists when α = 0; (iii) the prof-
itability of the fundamentalists improves as α increases (i.e. as they become
more confident in their estimated fundamental value). For α = 0, the absolute
wealth share of the fundamentalists is dropped from 50% to about 43%, while
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for α = 0.1, 0.5 and 1, it is increased from 50% to about 55%, 76% and 86%,
respectively. These results are further confirmed when we run Monte Carlo
simulations. We ran 1,000 independent simulations and discard the first 1,000
time periods to wash out the possible initial noise effect. The results are given
in Fig. 3. For four value of α we plot the average market price (left column),
return (middle column), and the fundamentalists absolute wealth share ac-
cumulation (right column). The initial wealth share for both types of traders
are equal w1,0 = 0.5. Because of m = 0, both the absolute and market wealth
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Fig. 3. Average Monte Carlo time series of market prices, returns, absolute wealth
share and market wealth share of the fundamentalists with α = 0, 0.1, 0.5 and 1.
3.2 Dynamics of the Market Fraction m
Intuitively it seems that the market price is partially determined by the market
dominance of different players in the market. Therefore we would expect that
the market fraction, measured by parameterm, will influence the market price
and the consequent performance of fundamentalists and chartists.
Given that both α and m have a similar impact on the local stability of
the deterministic system (see He and Li [17]), we can demonstrate that they
play a similar role in terms of wealth accumulation. Again, by running one
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simulation over 20,000 time periods, Fig. 4 shows the absolute wealth share ac-
cumulations for the fundamentalists for three different values of m = −0.95, 0
and 0.5 with α = 0.5, γ = 2, µ = 0.5, δ = 0.85, w1,0 = 0.5. In this case, the fun-
damentalists form their conditional expectation by taking an average of the
latest market price and fundamental price. In all four cases, (i) the fundamen-
talists accumulate more wealth share than the trend followers in the long-run
(an increase from 50% to about 70-75%), however, the trend followers survive
in the long-run and they can even accumulate more wealth share in the short-
run when they dominate the market (this is the case when m = −0.95, which
corresponds to 97.5% of trend followers and 2.5% of the fundamentalists); (ii)
the profitability of the fundamentalists improves as m increases (i.e. as the
market fraction of the fundamentalists increases). Essentially, we have shown
that both α and m have a similar effect on profitability and survivability for
fundamentalists and trend followers. Comparison of Fig.2 and Fig. 4 indicates
that the parameter α affects wealth accumulation more than the parameter
m does.






















Fig. 4. Time series of the absolute wealth accumulation of the fundamentalists w1,t
with m = −0.95, 0, 0.5 and α = 0.5, γ = 2, µ = 0.5, δ = 0.85, w1,0 = 0.5.
When the fundamentalists are naive traders (i.e. α = 0 and E1,t(Pt+1) =
Pt) fundamental price doesn’t influence how they form their conditional ex-
pectation. We choose
α = 0, γ = 1, µ = 0.4, δ = 0.85, w1,0 = 0.5, m = −1, −0.5, 0, 0.5, 1. (22)
Again, for each set of parameters we run one simulation over 20,000 time
periods such that the corresponding limiting behaviour becomes clear. Fig.
5 illustrates the absolute wealth share accumulations of the fundamentalists
with different market fractionm = −1,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, and keeping all the other
conditions the same. They converge to different constant levels for different
values of m in the long-run. Note that, unlike the market price, the absolute
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wealth shares are independent from the market fraction m and they are cal-
culated for the given market price series. In particular, when m = ±1 the
market price is affected only by one type of traders, but the absolute wealth
share accumulations can still be calculated based on the market price. Fig. 5
shows that, overall, no one does significantly better by accumulating signifi-
cant higher absolute wealth share than the others. For m = 1 trend followers
don’t affect the market price. In this case, the long-run absolute wealth share
accumulation of the fundamental trading strategy stays just above the aver-
age level, indicating that the trend followers will survive in long-run, although
they have no impact on the market price and accumulate less absolute wealth
share. For m 6= 1 trend followers do slightly better by accumulating a higher
absolute wealth share. When m = −1 fundamentalists don’t affect the mar-
ket price. Under this scenario the trend followers accumulate more absolute
wealth share in long-run. Overall, the profitability of the fundamentalists im-
proves as m increases (i.e. as their market population share increases). These
results are further confirmed when we run Monte Carlo simulations. The re-
sults in Fig. 6 include the average market price, return, and absolute wealth
share accumulation for the fundamentalists. The initial wealth share for both
types of traders are equal w1,0 = 0.5. For different values of m, the market
wealth shares are different. It is also interesting to see that the average market
price increases, rather than decreases in the first case, stochastically. Given
the naive expectation of the fundamentalists this may be due to the trend
chasing activity of the trend followers.
























Fig. 5. Time series of the absolute wealth accumulation of the fundamentalists w1,t
with m = −1, −0.5, 0, 0.5, 1 and α = 0, γ = 1, µ = 0.4, δ = 0.85, w1,0 = 0.5.
The above analysis leads to the following implications for profitability and
survivability:
• Although the trend followers have no information on the fundamental value
they survive in the long-run and can even out-perform fundamentalists
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Fig. 6. Average Monte Carlo time series of market prices, returns and absolute
wealth share of the fundamentalists with α = 0, γ = 1, µ = 0.4, δ = 0.85, w1,0 =
0.5, and m = −0.5 (top row), 0 (second row), 0.5 (third row), 1(4-th row), -1(the
last row).
in the short-run. This may be due to the learning mechanism they are
engaged in.
• Fundamentalists’ profitability increases as they become more confident in
their estimates of fundamental value or they dominate the market.
• When the fundamentalists become naive traders, trend followers do better
and they accumulate a higher wealth share. In addition, their profitability
improves as their market population share increases.
The wealth share measures used in this paper compare the relative perfor-
mance between two trading strategists. Survivability of the chartists is mea-
sured by their positive wealth share generated from their trading strategy.
Overall, we have shown the short/long-run profitability for both the funda-
mental and trend following trading strategies, and the long-run survivability
for the trend following strategy. This result partially verifies Friedman’s ar-
gument that the chartists may do better in the short-run, but the market will
be dominated by the fundamentalists in the long-run. However, in contrast to
Friedman’s argument, chartists do survive in the long-run due to the learning
mechanism.
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4 Conclusion
In this study a market fractions model with heterogeneous traders in a sim-
ple asset-pricing and wealth dynamics framework is employed to investigate
market dominance, profitability, and whether investors who follow fundamen-
tal and trend following strategies survive in short/long-run. Two measures
of wealth are introduced to assess the connection between market dominance
and wealth dynamics.
The conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis, based on Monte Carlo
simulations, show that when the market is dominated by fundamentalists both
their absolute and market wealth proportions increase significantly in the long-
run. On the other hand, when trend followers dominate the market and the
deviation between fundamental price and the trending price series is small,
their wealth proportions fails to increase significantly. When the deviation is
large trend followers’ proportion of wealth increase.
The level of confidence fundamentalists have in the convergence of market
price to fundamental value impacts upon trend followers wealth proportions.
When they are less confident of convergence the market price can be driven
away by trend followers and fundamentalists’ wealth proportions decrease.
Though, the trend followers’ commensurate increase in wealth is relatively
small. As fundamentalists become increasingly confident in convergence trend
followers’ wealth proportions can be reduced dramatically over the long-run.
The key finding from our analysis which differs from what would be predicted
by Friedman is that trend followers do survive in the long-run in all scenarios,
while in the short-run they can out-perform fundamentalists which is consis-
tent with the traditional view.
A potentially fruitful line for future research would be to explore the im-
pact of information costs. In practice, information costs can be a non-trivial
component of fundamental analysis. Integrating a range of plausible costs
structures into a MF model could elucidate their affect on fundamentalists
wealth share. In contrast, chartists’ reliance on costless information and learn-
ing may explain their survival in the long-run.
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